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Abstract
The last twenty years of the twentieth century witnessed regulatory change not
seen since the Great Depression. That regulatory change, culminating with the
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, produced a significant
consolidation within the banking industry, resulting from mergers and failures,
that accelerated near the end of the century. Unlike the mergers and failures, the
large numbers of new entrants did not receive the same attention. Nonetheless, the
new entrants tempered the decline in the overall number of banking institutions.
This paper examines correlates with the number of bank new-charters, failures,
and mergers during the 1980s and 1990s. We employ the fixed- and randomeffect regression technique – employing a normal, Poisson, and negative binomial
distributions. Among the results, we find that increases in the number of branches
relative to the number of banks significantly associate with fewer new charters
(births) and more mergers (marriages). Interestingly, increasing the number of
offices (banks plus branches) significantly associates with more deaths (failures).
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: G2, L2
Keywords: commercial banks, new charters, failures, mergers

1.

Introduction

The Great Depression and the last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed two periods of
dramatic regulatory and structural change in the U.S. banking industry. While many important
regulations were enacted during the Great Depression, the 1980s and 1990s experienced the
repeal and/or reversal of most depression-era financial regulations. Moreover, the 1980s and
1990s also experienced significant change from a system with much geographic limitation on
banking and branching to one now characterized by interstate banking and branching.
Severe financial turbulence – the savings and loan debacle followed by the crisis in the
commercial banking industry – also characterized the last 20 years of the twentieth century.
Those crises produced failure rates among financial institutions not seen since the Great
Depression. In addition, the regulatory changes that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s were
triggered by those financial crises and problems. Conventional wisdom suggests that the
emergence of interstate banking and branching generated a significant increase in mergers and
acquisitions (Rhodes 2000, and Jeon and Miller 2001a). Together, a large exodus of institutions
from the banking industry resulted from the large number of mergers and failures. Less well
documented, but equally important, new charters counterbalanced that movement to some extent.
This paper focuses on important elements of those events – births (new charters), deaths
(failures), and marriages (mergers) -- in the U.S. commercial banking industry. We consider the
effects, if any, of the existing banking structure, the number of banks and branches, on the
evolution of the U.S. banking industry by examining births, deaths, and marriages in each state.
Moreover, our findings are conditioned on private business decisions such as portfolio and
income statement. Two findings stand out. One, increases in the number of branches relative to
the number of banks significantly associate with fewer new charters (births) and more mergers
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(marriages). Interestingly, increasing the number of offices (banks plus branches) significantly
associates with more deaths (failures). Two, an increase in the non-interest proportion of total
expenses significantly associates with fewer births, fewer marriages, but with fewer deaths.1
The paper progresses as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of regulatory and
structural change over the past 25 years. Section 3 examines the existing literature that considers
new charters, failures, and mergers. Section 4 describes the database and outlines the empirical
tests. Section 5 concludes.
2.

Regulatory and Structural Change: An Overview

The U.S. commercial banking industry has undergone significant regulatory adjustment in the
last twenty years, including, but not limited to, the Depository Institution Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980, the Depository Institution Act of 1982, and the Interstate
Banking and Branching efficiency Act of 1994.2
Early in U.S. banking history, commercial banks received their charters from individual
states and could not operate across state lines. The National Banking Act of 1864 permitted
chartering of national banks by the Comptroller of the Currency, but this new legislation,
although silent on the issue of branching by the national banks, was interpreted as conforming to
existing prohibitions against branching across state borders. The McFadden Act of 1927 and the
Banking Act of 1933 generally prohibited branching across state lines. Because of its regulatory
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Jeon and Miller (2001b) examine possible causes of birth, death, and marriage rates, using ordinary least squares
and Tobit analysis and a pooled data set. Our current paper uses the same database, but employs fixed and randomeffects regression techniques under normal, Poisson, and negative binomial distribution assumptions with a panel
data structure.
2

Our historical discussion of banking regulation relies heavily on Kane (1996) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999).
3

history, the U.S. banking industry possesses many more independent institutions than is the norm
in the rest of the world.3
Several loopholes existed, however, in the legal landscape. First, seven bank holding
companies, who already operated across state lines at the time of the McFadden Act legislation,
were grandfathered. But second, and more important, bank holding companies were permitted to
acquire banks across state lines, if such actions were explicitly permitted by the states involved.
That second loophole was first mined in 1975 when Maine adopted legislation that permitted
out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire Maine banks, if reciprocity existed in the states
of the acquiring holding companies. But substantial movement did not really begin until 1982
when New York passed similar reciprocity legislation and Massachusetts passed regional
reciprocity legislation restricted to the New England states. The overture by New York led to a
patchwork of regional reciprocity pacts over the next few years. Most states participated in one
or more regional packs with California, New York, and Texas as notable exceptions
(exclusions).
Although banks were allowed to acquire failed thrift institutions across state lines as a
result of the savings and loan crisis, the bulk of bank mergers across state lines still proceeded
through bank holding companies. Finally, and most recently, the Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted banks to acquire banks in other states.4
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At the other extreme, Canada currently has 8 domestic banks and 43 foreign banks. The domestic banks
experienced a recent fall from 11 to 8 with the loss of the three smallest banks. Although relative large in number,
foreign banks held just over 1 percent of total Canadian bank assets at the end of 1998. Information on the number
and size of banking operations comes from the web site of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
at http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/AndreE/Index.htm. The U.S., on the other hand, had 8,774 banks at the end of 1998.
The U.S. banking data used come from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on-line data posted at
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob.
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States could opt out of this legislation, if they so chose. To date, only Texas and Montana have opted out of
interstate banking and branching.
4

Focusing our attention on intrastate, rather than interstate, banking, states were
historically divided into three groups: (i) those states that allowed statewide branching with few
restrictions, (ii) those states that allowed limited statewide branching with numerous restrictions,
and (iii) those states that allowed only unit banking with essentially no branching activity.
Legislative activity has gradually reduced the number of states to a very few that have unit
banking or limited branching.
Branching and merger restrictions were originally promulgated to prevent banking
institutions from monopolizing credit markets. That same legislation, however, frequently
granted local monopoly power to smaller community banks. Thus, the relaxation of restrictions
on interstate and intrastate banking and branching may lead to the acquisition of a large number
of small community banks. An important policy concern associated with such a prospect is the
effect on the supply of credit to small businesses, organizations that many see as the real engines
of growth.
In sum, economic events and regulatory change have produced merger and failure
activity in the U.S. commercial banking industry not seen since the Great Depression.
Furthermore, many new commercial banks entered the market with new charters, tending to
moderate the decline in the number of banking institutions.
3.

Literature Review

Several papers explore the recent activity in new charters, failures, and mergers, although few
consider all three activities together. Amos (1992) examines the regional pattern of commercial
bank failure rates during the 1980s (i.e., 1982 to 1988). He uses the state as his level of
observation and generates a cross-section sample of 50 observations by averaging the bank
failure rate data across the 1982 to 1988 period. He introduces regulatory (e.g., dummy variables
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for branching regulation) and state-level macroeconomic variables (e.g., gross state product,
sectoral composition of gross state product) to explain the pattern of bank closings. He concludes
that states experience higher failure rates when the state’s economy possesses a larger share in
oil and gas extraction and more volatility in economic variables. He finds little evidence
suggesting that failures correlate with the branching status dummy variables or states with higher
concentrations of farming or manufacturing.
Cebula (1994) modifies and improves Amos’s (1992) analysis in three ways. He
introduces bank financial variables in addition to the state-level economic and regulatory
variables. He also extends the sample through 1992 and adjusts the regression analysis for
heteroskedasticity. He follows Amos (1992) and averages the data over the 1982 to 1992 period
and performs cross-section regressions with 50 observations. He derives several additional
general conclusions. States with higher capital ratios and lower net charge-offs to loans correlate
with lower failure rates. More limited evidence emerges that easier regulation on branching and
a higher average cost of funds associates with a higher bank-closing rate.
Chou and Cebula (1996) perform a similar analysis of the failure rates across states for
the savings and loan industry. They consider savings and loan failures in each state over the
1985 to 1988 period relative to the average number of savings and loans in operation from 1984
to 1988. Since some of the observations on the failure rate are zero, they use the Tobit model
with heteroskedastic errors. They find that four types of variables correlate significantly with the
failure rate – regional economic conditions (e.g., the average growth rate of GSP), financial
variables (e.g., the average cost of funds), regulatory structure (e.g., federally chartered stock
institutions to all FSLIC-insured institutions), and political variables (e.g., dummy variables
indicating that states had representation on the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
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Committee or the House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee). Their most robust
findings include the following: failure rates associate negatively with the growth rate of gross
state product, positively with the average cost of funds, positively with the proportion of stock
(rather than mutual) associations, and negatively with federally chartered (rather than state
chartered) stock associations.
Jeon and Miller (2001b) consider the correlates with new charters (birth) rates, failure
(death) rates, and merger (marriage) rates for the fifty states and the District of Columbia for
1978 to 1998. They employ pooled ordinary least squares, homogeneous Tobit, and
heterogeneous Tobit specifications. They report several findings. Other things constant, higher
failures per bank occur in those states with more restrictive branching regulation. At the same
time, less-restrictive state-level branching regulation correlates with more new charters and
mergers. Interestingly, and counter to conventional wisdom, interstate branching and banking
possess few significant effects on birth, death, and marriage rates. Coupling that lack of
significant effects with the significant effects for the variable capturing intrastate branching
effects cause Jeon and Miller to conclude that the birth, death, and marriage rates responded
more to intrastate deregulation than to interstate deregulation.
DeYoung (1999) explores the life cycle of de novo banks in the U.S. since 1980. He finds
that newly chartered banks possess lower failure rates than existing commercial banks during the
first few years of operation. But, their failure rates rise to exceed that of existing banks after
those first few years and then converge back to the failure rate of established banks over time.
DeYoung then proposes a simple life-cycle model of de novo bank failure and tests that theory
with a hazard model for a sample of 303 newly chartered banks. The initial capitalization of de
novo banks explains their initial lower failure rates when they earn negative net incomes. The
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capital cushion, however, disappears before net income becomes positive and stable enough to
stave off failure for those de novo banks that do fail. DeYoung concludes that if the policy
objective focuses on eliminating the failure of newly chartered commercial banks, then
regulators should increase the initial capital requirements for de novo entry. Significant increases
of capital requirements, however, may too severely restrict the number of de novo entries in
DeYoung’s view. That is, regulators should not prevent all bank failures.
Amel and Liang (1997) apply a two-equation model of entry and performance
(profitability) to the U.S. commercial banking industry. They examine the hypothesis that bank
entry limits the persistence of above-average profits in a competitive environment. By entry,
they mean new banks (new charters) or new branches. Their database includes the entry of new
banks and new branches into local banking markets from 1977 to 1988 – over 4,000 entries into
2,300 local banking markets. They conclude that the competitive process exists in the U.S.
commercial banking industry. That is, higher profits attract entry and entry reduces profits, if
slowly. Moreover, market size and growth, measured by population and its growth, correlate
positively with bank entry. Finally, legal branching restrictions do not play a major role in
explaining bank entry.
4.

Database and Empirical Tests

Database
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reports balance sheet and income statement data
aggregated for each state and the District of Columbia.5 Our cross-section time-series database
includes the 50 states and the District of Columbia over 23 years from 1966 to 1998 – a panel
data set of 1652 observations.

5

The commercial bank balance sheet and income data on a state-by-state basis come from the Federal Deposit
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Our analysis examines the determinants of births, deaths, and marriages as measured by
new charters, failures, and mergers in each state (and the District of Columbia) for each year.
Our explanatory variables in each state fall into two categories – financial information on the
banks and banking structure variables.
The financial variables fall into three categories – portfolio allocation decisions, income
and expense factors, and risk variables. The portfolio allocation decisions include equity to
assets, loans to assets, and deposits to assets. The income and expense variables include net
income to total assets, non-interest expense to total (interest and non-interest) expense, and noninterest revenue to total (interest and non-interest) income. Provisions for loan losses to total
loans, reserves for loan losses to total loans, and net charge-offs to loans measure the riskiness of
the portfolio.
Finally, two variables capture the baking structure within states – the number of banks
and the number of branches.
Empirical Tests
The dependent variables in our regression analysis include the number of births (new charters),
deaths (failures), and marriages (mergers).6 For each dependent variable, we look for correlates
with the dependent variables from state-level balance sheet and income statement data as well as
banking structure data in each year from 1968 to 1998. For the regression analysis, we include
the same set of independent variables for each dependent variable. We include portfolio
allocation variables – loans to assets (lta), deposits to assets (dta), and equity to assets (eta); risk

Insurance Corporation (http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/).
6

New charters include all new charters. In addition to de novo entry, the data also contain the combining of several
existing charters, the conversion of one charter type to another, the absorption of banks from another charter, and so
on. The reader needs to keep that point in mind when interpreting our results.
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variables – provisions for loan losses to total loans (plltl), reserves for loan losses to total loans
(rlltl), and net charge-offs to loans (ncofftl); income and expense variables – non-interest income
to total income (niiti), non-interest expense to total expense (niete), and banking structure
variables – the number of banks (banks) and branches (branch).
Finally, since the dependent variables are nonnegative integers including zero entries, we
perform fixed- and random-effect Poisson and negative binomial regressions in addition to
regular fixed- and random-effect ordinary least squares regressions.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the specific findings, we offer a few comments
about the evolution of our research design. Jeon and Miller (2001b) considered birth, death, and
marriage rates. While most observations were positive, some observations possessed zero values.
Thus, for a cross-section, time-series pooled data set, they followed the path in the existing
literature and adopted ordinary least squares (i.e., Amos 1992), homogeneous Tobit (Cebula
1994), and heterogeneous Tobit (Chou and Cebula 1996) specifications. Instead, this paper
follows an alternative path. Focusing on the number of births, deaths, and marriages rather than
on the birth, death, and marriage rates, we adopt counting regression techniques for the
longitudinal data set. As such, we can then employ both the fixed- and random-effects regression
techniques, providing an interesting dimension to the analysis.
A well-known problem with the Poisson specification is that it imposes the condition that
the mean of the dependent variable equals its variance. If not true, then the Poisson regressions
will provide biased estimates of the standard error and subsequent significance tests. Moreover,
the problem usually arises as “over dispersion,” where the estimated standard errors are too low
causing the identification of erroneous significant coefficients. One potential solution to the over
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dispersion problem is the use of the negative binomial regression.7
Correlates with Bank New-Charters, Failures, and Merger
Results from Bank New-Charter Regressions. Table 1 reports the regression results for bank
charters.8 Note first that significant coefficients within a fixed-effect specification also come
with the same-signed significant coefficients in the paired random-effects specification. The
standard fixed- and random-effects specifications possess 3 significant coefficients – the
coefficients of the number of banks, non-interest expense to total expense and loans to total
assets. The Poisson specification jumps the number of significant coefficients to 8, adding 5 new
coefficients – the coefficients of the number of branches, net income to total assets, provisions
for loan losses to total loans, reserves for loan losses to total loans, and net charge-offs to total
loans. The over dispersion problem contained in the Poisson specification leads to the negative
binomial specification. Because the standard errors increase, two coefficients that were
significant under the Poisson specification, once again are no longer significant – the coefficients
of net income to total assets and reserves for loan losses to total loans.
More new charters significantly associate with more banks, given the number of
branches, but fewer branches, given the number of banks. Both changes mean that the average
number of branches to bank falls. That is, when the average number of branches to bank falls
within a state, that state experiences more new charters.
Next, a higher level of net charge-offs to total loans, implying a higher fraction of
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The STATA package provides conditional fixed-effects and random-effects Poisson and negative binomial
routines, which we employ in our econometric analysis.
8

Our discussion of results focuses primarily on those independent variables whose coefficients are significant at the
5-percent level of significance, or better. When the coefficient changes sign across the regular, Poisson, and
negative binomial fixed- and random-effects specifications, we refer to the negative binomial results in our
discussion.
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problem loans in a state, significantly associates with fewer new charters. At the same time, a
higher level of provisions for loan losses to total loans significantly associates with more new
charters. Net charge-offs probably provide a better measure of the state banking systems risk
level as it captures actual right-offs of loans held by banks in the state. Provisions for loan losses,
on the other hand, reflect the ability of banks to set aside current income. When the banking
system experiences stress, banks may not have the income that they can allocate toward
provisions for loan losses.
Finally, states whose banks possess higher average loans to total assets or lower noninterest expenses to total expenses also experience significantly higher new charters. When
evaluating these coefficients, we must remember that the effect holds net income per total assets
constant. So an increase in loans to total assets holding net income to total assets constant means
that the banking system relies more heavily on income from loans and less on income from
securities when they book their net income. Thus, for a given net income to total assets, a higher
ratio of loans to assets implies less productivity in generating loan income, since loan interest
rates exceed interest rates on securities. At the same time, lower non-interest expenses to total
expenses for a given level of net income total assets means that the state banking system relies
less on labor and capital and more on deposits and other sources of funds to generate its income
stream. So potential new entrants may see an opportunity to do well, since they will have lower
non-interest expenses and some room may exist for improving the interest revenue from loans.
Results for Bank Failure Rate Regressions. Table 2 reports the regression results for bank
failures. Note again that significant coefficients within a fixed-effect specification come with the
same-signed significant coefficients in the paired random-effects specification, except for the
coefficient of banks that is only significant in the regular random-effects specification and only
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significant for the conditional fixed-effect Poisson specification. Including banks in the
calculation, the standard fixed- and random-effects specifications possess 5 significant
coefficients – the coefficients of the number of banks, the number of branches, net income to
total assets, non-interest income to total income and equity to total assets. The Poisson
specification jumps the number of significant coefficients to 9, adding 4 new coefficients – the
coefficients of non-interest expense to total expense, provisions for loan losses to total loans,
reserves for loan losses to total loans, and net charge-offs to total loans. Using the negative
binomial specification to address the potential over dispersion problem causes three coefficients
that were significant under the Poisson specification to lose their significance because the
standard errors increase – the coefficients of net income to total assets, provisions for loan losses
to total loans, and net charge-offs losses to total loans. Finally, one new coefficient becomes
significant – loans to total assets.
More mergers significantly associate with a fewer banks, given the number of branches,
but more branches, given the number of banks. Both changes mean that the average number of
branches to bank falls. That is, when the average number of branches to bank rises within a state,
that state experiences more mergers.
Next, a higher level of reserves for loan losses to total loans associates, implying a higher
accumulated stock of problem loans in a state, significantly associates with more mergers.
Reserves for loan losses also probably provide a good measure of the state banking systems risk
level as it captures the existing stock of possible write-offs in the near future held by banks in the
state.
Finally, states whose banks possess higher average loans to total assets, higher average
equity to total assets, higher average non-interest income to total income, or lower average non-
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interest expenses to total expenses also experience a significantly higher number of mergers.
When evaluating these coefficients, we must, once again, remember that these effects hold net
income per total assets constant. We discussed in the previous section the meaning of higher
loans to total assets and lower non-interest expense to total expense. Here, we consider the other
two coefficients. So an increase in equity to total assets holding net income to total assets
constant means that the banking system relies more on capital and relies less on sources of funds
to generate their net income. Thus, for a given net income to total assets, a higher ratio of equity
to total assets implies more productivity in generating income from the resource base. At the
same time, higher non-interest income to total income for a given level of net income to total
assets means that the state banking system relies less on loan and security income and more on
off-balance sheet income to generate its income stream.
Results for Bank Merger Rate Regressions. Table 3 reports the regression results for bank
mergers. Note once again that significant coefficients within a fixed-effect specification come
with the same-signed significant coefficients in the paired random-effects specification. The
standard fixed- and random-effects specifications possess 5 significant coefficients – the
coefficients of the number of banks, the number of branches, net income to total assets, noninterest income to total income and net charge-offs to total loans. The Poisson specification
jumps the number of significant coefficients to 10, adding 5 new coefficients – the coefficients
of non-interest expense to total expense, loans to total assets, equity to total assets, provisions for
loan losses to total loans, and reserves for loan losses to total loans. Using the negative binomial
specification to address the potential over dispersion problem causes one, maybe two,
coefficients that were significant under the Poisson specification to lose their significance
because the standard errors increase – the coefficients of net income to total assets and
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provisions for loan losses to total loans. The coefficient of net income to total assets is
significant at the 5-percent level in the conditional fixed-effect negative binomial specification,
but not in the random-effects negative binomial specification.
More failures significantly associate with a more banks, given the number of branches,
and more branches, given the number of banks. Both changes mean that the average number of
offices increases. That is, when the average number of offices rises within a state, that state
experiences more failures.
Next, a higher level of reserves for loan losses to total loans or a higher level of net
charge-offs to total loans significantly associates with more failures. As noted above, reserves
for loan losses and net charge-offs probably provide good measures of the state banking systems
risk level as they capture the existing stock of actual and possible future write-offs held by banks
in the state.
Finally, states whose banks possess lower average loans to total assets, higher average
equity to total assets, higher average non-interest income to total income, or lower average noninterest expenses to total expenses also experience a significantly higher number of failures.
When evaluating these coefficients, we must, once again, remember that these effects holds net
income per total assets constant. We discussed in the previous sections the meaning of each of
these coefficients. Here, we note that the coefficients of non-interest income to total income,
non-interest expense to total expense have the same effects on mergers and failures. That may
not provide a conundrum, since within U.S. commercial banking, the bright line between
mergers and failures is not well drawn. That is, many mergers may have eventually led to failure
if the merger had not intervened. The coefficient on equity to total assets in this regression seems
counterintuitive. Some reverse causality may offer a compelling explanation. That is, if a state
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experiences a higher number of failures, then it probably lost banks that had lower equity to
assets, on average. If accurate, then the average level of equity to assets should increase in that
state.
5.

Conclusion

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry
beginning in the early 1980s and culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic consolidation with large numbers
of mergers and acquisitions. Less well documented, but equally important, was the continuing
entry of new banks, tempering the decline in the overall number of banking institutions.
This paper examines births, deaths, and marriages in the commercial banking industry.
We test for the correlates with the number of births, deaths, and marriages from a set of balance
sheet and income variables and banking structure variables. We employ fixed- and randomeffects regressions under the normal, Poisson, and negative binomial distribution assumptions.
Several general findings deserve mention. First, as the number of branches relative to the
number of banks increases, a significant decrease in new charters (births) and increase in
mergers (marriages) occurs. Interestingly, as the number of offices (banks plus branches) rises, a
significant rise in deaths (failures) occurs.
Second, an increase in the non-interest proportion of total expenses significantly
associates with fewer births, fewer marriages, but with fewer deaths. At the same time, an
increase in non-interest income to total income significantly associates with more marriages and
more deaths. Increases in loans to total assets significantly associates with higher numbers of
marriages and lower numbers of deaths. On the other hand, increases in equity to total assets
significantly associates with a higher number of marriages and deaths.
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Finally, higher provisions for loan losses to total loans significantly associates with more
births. Higher reserves for loan losses significantly associates with more marriages and more
deaths. Then higher net charge-offs to total loans significantly associates with fewer births, but
more deaths. That is, the results suggest that reserves for loan losses and net charge-offs provide
better measures of risk in the banking system than provisions for loan losses. Since provisions
for loan losses reflect an ability to offset other profits, provisions are set aside when the bank is
not experiencing very difficult situations.
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Table 1: Regression Results with New Charters as the Dependent Variable
Independent
Variable
banks
branch
nita
niiti
niete
lta
dta
eta
plltl
rlltl
ncofftl
cons
Note:

(1) Fixed-Effects (2) Random-Effects
Regression Model Regression Model
Coef.

t

P>|t|

Coef.

t

P>|t|

0.0444 16.21 0.000

0.0251 17.21 0.000

-0.0004 -0.67 0.504
30.7244
6.7623

Coef.

t

P>|t|

Coef.

P>|t|

P>|t|

0.48 0.633

48.3476

0.74 0.459

19.3557

3.00 0.003

20.8387

11.0633

1.01 0.311

-3.0423 -0.46 0.649

-0.5969

-0.80 0.426

-0.7363 -0.98 0.325

-0.7893 -0.76 0.448

-0.9603 -0.93 0.354

-7.9930 -2.71 0.007

-2.5212

-8.20 0.000

-2.3858 -7.78 0.000

-1.7488 -3.89 0.000

-1.6194 -3.62 0.000

4.1556 12.07 0.000

3.8384 11.21 0.000

6.08 0.000

-3.0491 -0.78 0.436

0.35 0.725 -12.1933 -0.68 0.495
0.18 0.858

-0.7146

-1.56 0.119

-0.7456 -1.64 0.101

3.5246

2.1254

1.15 0.251

1.3701

0.75 0.456

3.3612

0.36 0.719

29.9281

4.61 0.000

29.5885

4.56 0.000

26.7946

2.9980

0.08 0.936

-9.4284

-70.9068 -1.16 0.246 -44.2510 -0.70 0.487 -27.8910
-6.1567 -1.35 0.176

-2.43 0.015

-9.0864 -2.36 0.018

6.97 0.000
1.15 0.250

4.72 0.000

-0.0002 -4.14 0.000

1.12 0.261 13.4870

-0.8613 -1.37 0.172

21.5728

0.0009

t

-0.0003 -5.33 0.000

20.5000

3.14 0.002

Coef.

-0.0003 -9.60 0.000
3.24 0.001

0.0006

t

-0.0004 -11.21 0.000

-16.7293 -0.29 0.773
6.4896

P>|t|

-0.0011 -2.82 0.005

6.13 0.000

0.0011

t

0.0013 10.21 0.000

-1.4769 -0.38 0.703
6.3033

Coef.

(5) Conditional
Fixed-Effects
(6) Random-Effects
(4) Random-Effects Negative Binominal Negative Binomial
Poisson Model
Model
Model

8.82 0.000

-10.6772 -3.67 0.000
21.0046

(3) Conditional
Fixed-Effects
Poisson Model

3.2850

1.38 0.167

6.58 0.000

-0.8197 -1.31 0.189
2.8297

0.98 0.328

2.71 0.007 27.0582

2.75 0.006

-1.1828 -0.19 0.849

-1.2702 -0.21 0.837

-3.96 0.000 -28.6157 -4.06 0.000 -26.6448 -2.41 0.016 -26.9535 -2.45 0.014
0.7383

1.52 0.129

0.0363

0.05 0.958

The Table reports results of panel data regressions of fixed- and random-effects regressions for normal, Poisson, and negative exponential distributions.
The dependent variable is the number of new bank charters in each state and the District of Columbia from 1966 to 1998. The independent variables
include the number of banks (bank), the number of branches (branches), net income to total assets (nita), non-interest income to total income (niiti),
non-interest expense to total expense (niete), loans to total assets (lta), deposits to total assets (dta), equity to total assets (eta), provisions for loan losses
to total loans (plltl), reserves for loan losses to total loans (rlltl), net charge-offs to total loans (plltl), and a constant (cons). In the column headings,
Coef. means the coefficient estimate; t means the t-statistic; and P > |t| means the probability that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from
zero.

Table 2: Regression Results with Mergers as the Dependent Variable
Independent
Variable
banks
branch
nita
niiti
niete
lta
dta
eta
plltl
rlltl
ncofftl
_cons
Note:

(1) Fixed-Effects
Regression Model
Coef.

t

P>|t|

-0.0067 -1.56 0.118
0.0093 10.52 0.000

(2) Random-Effects
Regression Model
Coef.
0.0104

t

P>|t|

7.40 0.000

0.0051 12.05 0.000

(3) Conditional
Fixed-Effects
Poisson Model
Coef.
-0.0005

t

P>|t|

-3.29 0.001

0.0003 10.60 0.000

(5) Conditional
Fixed-Effects
(6) Random-Effects
(4) Random-Effects Negative Binominal Negative Binomial
Poisson Model
Model
Model
Coef.
-0.0002

t

P>|t|

-1.36 0.172

0.0004 12.22 0.000

Coef.

t

P>|t|

-0.0010 -5.80 0.000
0.0004

9.23 0.000

Coef.

t

P>|t|

-0.0008 -4.78 0.000
0.0004 10.41 0.000

-356.6096 -3.56 0.000 -372.1415 -3.92 0.000 -73.5068 -13.94 0.000 -72.0924 -13.75 0.000 -19.5379 -1.90 0.057 -18.0669 -1.78 0.075
28.0891

2.71 0.007

-2.6736 -0.59 0.555
-6.6061 -1.24 0.216

46.5766

4.80 0.000

6.5481 12.67 0.000

6.6575 12.94 0.000

-6.7670 -1.54 0.123

-2.5771 -11.37 0.000

-2.5478 -11.27 0.000

0.42 0.674

-0.2733

-1.13 0.258

-0.3936

-1.64 0.102

2.58 0.010

-0.0428

-0.13 0.900

0.0818

0.24 0.810

0.0347

20.7876 15.21 0.000

16.9222

1.9944

5.7102

0.95 0.343

14.6853

65.4271

2.35 0.019

124.7606

-71.5677 -0.79 0.428
51.6905

4.81 0.000 20.9971 15.26 0.000

-54.2620 -0.60 0.551 -27.8284

-6.34 0.000 -27.5990

-6.30 0.000

2.8245

2.78 0.005

-1.5374 -3.21 0.001
1.5842

1.4521

0.06 0.956

0.3176

0.51 0.609

6.38 0.000 17.0503

6.52 0.000

-5.5010 -0.62 0.535

-18.5307 -0.33 0.743 23.4321

8.53 0.000

22.9422

8.38 0.000

20.3871

-16.1895 -0.17 0.865

-33.0195 -0.34 0.737 10.4739

2.31 0.021

9.2604

2.05 0.040

-7.2033 -0.73 0.463

0.7401

1.91 0.056

2.88 0.004

-4.9361 -0.56 0.575

3.75 0.000 19.4201

See table 1. The dependent variable is the number of mergers in each state and the District of Columbia from 1966 to 1998.
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2.94 0.003

3.10 0.002

0.92 0.358

-21.4242 -3.32 0.001

2.9789

-1.5784 -3.30 0.001

3.62 0.000

-8.0067 -0.82 0.410
-2.2987 -3.56 0.000

Table 3: Regression Results with Failures as the Dependent Variable

Independent
Variable
banks
branch
nita
niiti
niete
lta
dta
eta
plltl
rlltl
ncofftl
_cons
Note:

(1) Fixed-Effects
Regression Model
Coef.

t

P>|t|

(2) Random-Effects
Regression Model
Coef.

t

P>|t|

(3) Conditional
Fixed-Effects
Poisson Model
Coef.

t

P>|t|

0.0156 6.77 0.000

0.0060 7.05 0.000

0.0014

4.80 0.000

0.0037 7.78 0.000

0.0008 3.25 0.001

0.0010 10.47 0.000

-248.1555 -4.58 0.000 -234.0711 -4.54 0.000 -36.6174 -3.81 0.000

0.0014

t

P>|t|

Coef.

t

P>|t|

Coef.

t

P>|t|

6.19 0.000

0.0004

2.00 0.046

0.0007

3.59 0.000

0.0009 12.02 0.000

0.0004

5.41 0.000

0.0005

6.68 0.000

-35.1943 -3.71 0.000 -34.4116 -2.46 0.014 -25.2241 -1.88 0.060

18.5123 3.52 0.000

-1.2498 -0.51 0.610

-3.0480 -1.29 0.196

-4.2804 -7.57 0.000

-4.3491 -7.83 0.000

-3.7460 -4.43 0.000

-3.9030 -4.77 0.000

-4.6955 -1.63 0.103

-0.6135 -0.24 0.813

-5.4015 -7.77 0.000

-5.3215 -8.32 0.000

-2.0077 -2.10 0.036

-1.9226 -2.10 0.035

4.7966 1.47 0.141

7.6521 2.48 0.013

-0.3584 -0.40 0.686

-39.8029 -2.65 0.008

-18.1185 -1.29 0.197

49.2175 1.62 0.106
193.2202 3.76 0.000

8.9819

5.06 0.000

Coef.

18.6357 3.32 0.001

-112.4796 -2.30 0.021

6.0593

(5) Conditional
Fixed-Effects
(6) Random-Effects
(4) Random-Effects Negative Binominal Negative Binomial
Poisson Model
Model
Model

2.18 0.029

-82.0769 -1.69 0.091 -34.9076 -4.50 0.000

6.5533

5.63 0.000

3.5454

2.07 0.038

0.6342

0.73 0.468

-1.6101 -1.38 0.168

9.8971

2.50 0.012

18.8900

2.55 0.011

0.2768

0.24 0.810

3.51 0.000 17.2397

3.41 0.001

2.1624

0.21 0.833

5.56 0.000

26.5579

3.37 0.001 24.7902

3.30 0.001

212.3618 4.08 0.000 108.8493 13.75 0.000 103.9073 13.26 0.000

59.4630

5.86 0.000 51.2563

5.68 0.000

31.1802 1.04 0.301

32.2542

5.80 0.000

-5.6603 -1.61 0.109

-30.1056 -3.93 0.000

4.2077

30.3545
0.4965

-5.3649 -0.49 0.623

0.50 0.615

See Table 1. The dependent variable is the number of failures in each state and the District of Columbia from 1966 to 1998.
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-1.2051 -0.92 0.358

